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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In 2013, at the peak of the economic and financial crisis, Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 
established an integrated and multilevel structure – the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – 
transferring the direct supervision competences on the most systemically important banks to the 
European Central Bank (ECB). One year later, Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 introduced the 
second pillar of the European Banking Union – the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) – that is, 
an EU-level system for the rescue of non-viable banking institutions. 
At the same time, Regulations (EU) No. 1024/2013 and No. 806/2014 tried to balance this 
additional transfer of powers to the EU through the strengthening of the transparency and 
democratic accountability standards within the context of the supervision and resolution policies in 
the Eurozone. Indeed, the Regulations in question reserved several original oversight powers for 
the European Parliament and the National Parliaments within the Banking Union governance. 
Partially reproducing the practice of the Monetary Dialogue (art. 284.3 TFEU), the new 
democratic oversight mechanisms have contributed to the establishing of a “Banking Dialogue” 
that includes, among others, hearings, reporting sessions and the transmission of information. 
However, unlike the Monetary Dialogue, the new Banking Dialogue involves not only the European 
Parliament, but also the National Parliaments.  
Against this background, the paper seeks to first analyse the general legal framework that 
characterize the Banking Union governance. Secondly, it will analyze the dialogical procedures 
between the European Parliament – and in particular the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (ECON) – and the ECB in the field of Single Supervisory Mechanism. The third part of the 
paper focuses on the National Parliament’s participation in the democratic oversight over the EU 
banking supervisor. The last part of this paper contains concluding remarks look at whether these 
powers can, as regards the banking policies pursued in the Eurozone, indeed provide an “answer” 
to the problem of the “informational asymmetry” which has been identified by scholars as one of 
the main factors at the basis of the “executive dominance issue”. 
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INTRODUCTION	(*)	
 
 In 2013, at the peak of the economic and financial crisis, Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 
(hereinafter: SSM Regulation) established an integrated and multilevel structure – the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – transferring the direct supervision competences on the most 
systemically important banks to the European Central Bank (ECB). One year later, Regulation 
(EU) No. 806/2014 introduced the second pillar of the European Banking Union – the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) – that is, an EU-level system for the rescue of non-viable banking 
institutions. 
At the same time, Regulations (EU) No. 1024/2013 and No. 806/2014 tried to balance this 
additional transfer of powers to the EU through the strengthening of the transparency and 
democratic accountability standards within the context of the supervision and resolution policies 
in the Eurozone. Indeed, the Regulations in question reserved several original oversight powers for 
the European Parliament and the National Parliaments within the Banking Union governance. 
Partially reproducing the practice of the Monetary Dialogue (art. 284.3 TFEU), the new 
democratic oversight mechanisms have contributed to the establishing of a “Banking Dialogue” 
that includes, among others, hearings, reporting sessions and the transmission of information.  
However, unlike the Monetary Dialogue, the new Banking Dialogue involves not only the 
European Parliament, but also the National Parliaments. Several explanations may account for this 
difference between these dialogues of ‘first’ and ‘second’ generation. The Monetary Dialogue has 
been in place since 1992 as a part of the monetary policy – upon which the European Union (EU) 
has exclusive competence (article 3-1 c TFEU) – whereas the Banking Dialogue pertains to a 
much newer evolution visible in the recent creation of the Banking Union after the financial crisis. 
It is therefore in an area which had thus far largely remained the responsibility of the Member 
States alone and this new transfer of powers may account for the need to involve not only the 
European Parliament but also national parliaments even if, as highlighted below, their status does 
differ in these accountability procedures. Additionally, and perhaps primarily, the SSM is in itself 
a mixed mechanism in which national and European institutions are called to intervene and 
cooperate. In this sense, it has been considered that ‘such direct possibility for national 
parliaments to call the ECB to account seems appropriate given the mixed administration created. 
                                                
 
(*) Although the content of the paper is the result of a joint work, Diane Fromage has written paragraphs 4 and 5 
while Renato Ibrido the others. A draft version of this paper was presented in the conference “The Political Role of the 
European Central Bank in European Union Governance”, held on April 5-6, 2017 at Duisburg-Essen University. 
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It will often be the ECB, rather than the respective NCA [National Competent Authority], which 
decides on issues that may have a huge impact in the Member States’.1 
The question of the ECB’s accountability in general originally arose because of the decision to 
delegate the management of the monetary policy to an entity independent from political organs: as 
a compensation of this delegation of powers, the ECB had to be accountable to an elected organ.2 
This issue remained salient as the ECB received new banking supervision authorities.  
Against this backdrop, our paper seeks to first analyse the general legal framework that 
characterizes the Banking Union governance to set the background necessary to the analysis of the 
level of accountability within said Union. Secondly, we address the dialogical procedures between 
the European Parliament – and in particular the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
(ECON) – and the ECB in the field of Single Supervisory Mechanism. The third part of the paper 
focuses on National Parliament’s participation in the democratic oversight over the EU banking 
supervisor. The last part of this paper contains concluding remarks looking at whether these 
powers can, as regards the banking policies pursued in the Eurozone, indeed provide an “answer” 
to the problem of the “informational asymmetry” which has been identified by scholars as one of 
the main factors at the basis of the “executive dominance issue”3. 
From a methodological point of view, our paper will endorse a legal perspective, and more 
precisely a European Constitutional Law focus. Although the issue of the ECB’s accountability 
has been analyzed mainly by political scientists, it identifies one of the core topics of the process 
of “constitutional integration” in the EU. Especially in the field of the Banking Union, the issue of 
the parliamentary oversight over the ECB questions the future of democracy in Europe. The 
ECB’s dual role as the EU’s Banking supervisor and as the main responsible of its monetary 
policy also raises further question as to the reconciliation of both roles and potential overlaps. 
 
 
                                                
 
1 G. TER KUILE, L. WISSINK, W. BOVENSCHEIN, ‘Tailor-made accountability within the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism’, CMLR, 2015, 155-190, 171. 
2 G. CLAEYS, M. HALLBERG, O. TSCHEKASSIN, ‘European Central Bank accountability: How the monetary 
dialogue could evolve’, Bruegel policy contribution 2014/04, 2014, 3. Further on the ECB’s independence and the 
need for accountability mechanisms: C. ZILIOLI, ‘The independence of the European Central Bank and its new 
banking supervisory competences’ in D. RITLENG (ed), Independence and legitimacy in the institutional system of the 
European Union, OUP, 2016; F. AMTENBRINK, On the Legitimacy and Democratic Accountability of the European 
Central Bank, in A. ARNULL – D. WINCOTT (eds.), Accountability and Legittimacy in the European Union: Legal 
Arrangements and practical experience, Oxford, OUP, 2002, 147 ff.  
3 On this concept, see D. CURTIN, Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy, in The Modern 
Law Review, 1, 2014, 1 ff. and notably 15. 
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2.	The	Banking	Union	governance:	general	legal	framework	
 
2.1. The Single Supervisory Mechanism and the further pillars of the Banking Union 
project 
 
 The Banking Union architecture is built on three different pillars: the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS). 
The legal basis of the SSM is the art. 127, par. 6 TFUE according to which: 
 
“The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial 
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings” 
 
 Such a conferral of powers took place with the adoption of Regulation No. 1024/2013 
which transferred the direct supervision competences on the most systemically important banks in 
the Eurozone to the ECB. The National supervisory authorities, instead, continue to carry out the 
supervision of “less significant banks”, albeit under the ultimate responsibility of the ECB. 
With the aim to ensure a separation between supervisory responsibilities and monetary policy, the 
ECB’s supervisory tasks are carried out by a Supervisory Board (SB). The SB is a new internal 
body of the ECB which prepares the draft decisions adopted by the ECB Governing Council under 
a non-objection procedure. Indeed, the Governing Council maintains the power to reject the 
Supervisory Board’s decisions within a defined period of time. The Supervisory Board is 
composed of a Chair, a Vice-Chair, four representatives of the ECB and one representative from 
each national supervisory authority in the participating Member States. The appointment of the 
Chair, Vice-Chair and four representatives of the ECB is submitted to the EP’s approval, which is 
held at a public hearing of the candidates proposed by the ECB. 
With the introduction of the SSM, the role of the European Banking Authority (EBA) – within the 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) – is undergoing some important changes. In 
any case, the EBA – a regulatory agency already established with Regulation No. 1093/2010 – 
maintains the responsibility for the implementation of the Single Rulebook, promoting the 
uniformity at the EU level of the secondary regulations in the banking sector. 
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It is important to emphasize the asymmetry between the EBA and the Banking Union: the EBA 
competences embrace the whole EU, while the SSM and SRM Regulations find application only 
in the Eurozone and in those non-Euro countries that opt to join the Banking Union mechanisms. 
Secondly, Regulation No. 806/2014 and Directive No. 59/2014 introduced the SRM, that is, an 
EU level system for the resolving of non-viable financial institutions. 
The SRM is based on a distribution of tasks between an atypical European agency – the Single 
Resolution Board – and the national authorities. The Board is directly responsible for the cross-
border cases and for the significant banks, while the national authorities ensure the resolution of 
the other cases. However, the resolution scheme adopted by the Board enters into force only if, 
within 24 hours after its adoption by the Board, there are no objections from the Council (acting 
by simple majority) on a proposal by the Commission4. 
The non-objection procedure aims to ensure the compliance of the Single Resolution Mechanism 
with the Meroni doctrine. Indeed, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, 
an EU legislative act cannot delegate discretionary powers to an EU agency lacking a Treaty base. 
With the aim to bypass the limits of the Meroni doctrine and at the same time to safeguard the 
compliance with the EU Law, the involvement of the Commission and the Council within the 
SRM decision making process allows to ascribe a discretionary decision to institutions regulated 
by the Treaties.  
The SRM finds a fundamental component in the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). This common 
fund, which is financed with the contributions of the same banks of the Banking Union participant 
                                                
 
4 “Immediately after the adoption of the resolution scheme, the Board shall transmit it to the Commission. 
Within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Commission shall either endorse 
the resolution scheme, or object to it with regard to the discretionary aspects of the resolution scheme in the cases not 
covered in the third subparagraph of this paragraph. 
Within 12 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Commission may propose to the 
Council: 
(a) to object to the resolution scheme on the ground that the resolution scheme adopted by the Board does not 
fulfill the criterion of public interest referred to in paragraph 1(c); 
(b) to approve or object to a material modification of the amount of the Fund provided for in the resolution scheme 
of the Board. 
The resolution scheme may enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the Council or by the 
Commission within a period of 24 hours after its transmission by the Board. 
The Council or the Commission, as the case may be, shall provide reasons for the exercise of their power of 
objection. 
Where, within 24 hours from the transmission of the resolution scheme by the Board, the Council has approved the 
proposal of the Commission for modification of the resolution scheme on the ground referred to in point (b) of the 
third subparagraph or the Commission has objected in accordance with the second subparagraph, the Board shall, 
within eight hours modify the resolution scheme in accordance with the reasons expressed. 
Where the resolution scheme adopted by the Board provides for the exclusion of certain liabilities in the 
exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 27(5), and where such exclusion requires a contribution by the Fund 
or an alternative financing source, in order to protect the integrity of the internal market, the Commission may prohibit 
or require amendments to the proposed exclusion setting out adequate reasons based on an infringement of the 
requirements laid down in Article 27 and in the delegated act adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 
44(11) of Directive 2014/59/EU” (art. 18, par. 7 Regulation No. 806/2014). 
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countries, will be used for resolving the failing credit institutions. However, a precondition for 
accessing the fund is the application of the “bail-in” system. In order to minimize the costs of the 
resolution of a failing entity borne by the taxpayers, Directive No. 59/2014 introduces specific 
rules to avoid the application of the “bail-out” model. The “bail-in” principles ensure that 
shareholders and creditors of the failing entity suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate 
part of the costs arising from the failure of the entity. Only if necessary will it be possible to resort 
to the Single Resolution Fund. 
Finally, the EU institutions are currently working on several proposals designed to protect the 
depositors in case of insolvency or resolution of a bank. In particular, according to the proposal 
concerning the European Deposit Insurance Scheme,5 the protection of the depositors will be 
ensured through the collaboration between the national deposit guarantee schemes and a new 
European deposit insurance fund, managed by the SRB, and financed with the sector bank 
contributions. 
 
 
2.2. The parliamentary “counterpart” of the ECB within the Banking Union 
governancehe Single Supervisory Mechanism and the further pillars of the Banking 
Union project 
 
 As stated in the introduction, the conferral to the ECB of direct supervisory competences 
on the most systemically important banks (and indirect supervisory powers over the less 
significant credit institutions) implies the need to counterbalance the ECB’s independence with the 
introduction of appropriate democratic oversight mechanisms over the new European banking 
supervisor. On the one hand, the chances of a successful Banking Union project largely depend on 
the capacity of the ECB to endure the political and economic pressure, also from national 
governments and EU institutions. In this perspective, the legal clause (art. 19 Reg. SSM) that 
recognizes the independence of the ECB and national authorities within the SSM is structured 
similarly to the Article 130 TFEU concerning the ECB monetary policy6. 
On the other hand, the conferral of supervisory tasks draws the ECB into a potential space of 
politicization. As observed by the economic literature, the level of central bank independence is 
                                                
 
5 The proposal is under discussion in the European Parliament at the time of writing (March 2017).  
6 See M. MACCHIA, The indipendence status of the Supervisory Board and of the Single Resolution Board: an 
expansive claim of autonomy?, in E. BARUCCI – M. MESSORI (eds.), Towards the European Banking Union. 
Achievemnts and Open Problems, Bagno a Ripoli, Passigli, 2014, 117 ff. 
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inversely proportionate to the number of objectives that characterize the central bank’s mandate7. 
Moreover, the ECB is already called to maintain the price stability (art. 127(1) TFEU), including 
through unconventional monetary programmes to purchase Member State bonds on the secondary 
markets (Court of Justice, C-62/14 – Gauweiler e a.). 
Therefore, eight decades after the Carl Schmitt conference in Berlin, the thorny question of the 
“neutral powers” reemerged. In his speech in front of the Industrie- und Handelskammer of 
Berlin, the German scholar identified the Reichsbank of Weimar Republic as the paradigmatic 
case of neutrale Grösse. In other words, a technocratic institution called to make political 
decisions in place of political bodies but which is destined to be “capture” on the long period by 
political forces8.  
However, the political implications of the banking supervision9 entail appropriate parliamentary 
oversight channels and a robust democratic accountability framework regulated also by sources of 
hard law10. This is all the more true of banking supervision at supranational level and in the case 
of the ECB since it is amongst the most independent central banks worldwide. 
In this context, Article 21 of the SSM Regulation establishes that “the ECB shall be accountable to 
the European Parliament and to the Council for the implementation of this Regulation”. Although 
the SSM Regulation considered the European Parliament and the Council as the two 
“democratically legitimised institutions representing the citizens of the Union and the Member 
States” (recital no. 66), this paper cannot consider in detail the role of the Council within the 
Banking Union governance. It focuses mainly on the interactions between the ECB and the 
European Parliament. 
Arguably, the Council cannot be considered as the second Chamber of EU11. Firstly, unlike the 
German Bundesrat, the Council also acts as an executive body in the case establish by the Article 
                                                
 
7 Inter alia, see G. Fodor, Sull’autonomia della banche centrali, in L. BOSCO – R. TAMBORINI – F. TARGETTI 
(eds.), L’Italia e l’Europa oltre Maastricht (Supplemento a Economia e Banca, 7-8/1994-1995), 207 ff. 
8 See C. SCHMITT, Die neutralen Größen im heutigen Verfassungsstaat, in Das Problem der innerpolitischen 
Neutralität des Staates, now in Verfassungrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954, Berlin, Duncker & 
Humblot, 1958, 41 ff. 
9 About the essential elements of good supervision, see the IMF Staff Position Note May/18/2010 “The Making of 
Good Supervision: Learning to Say ‘No’, at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1008.pdf 
10 Among the sources of soft law, see the Principle 2 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf). In January 2014, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) set up a Task Force on Impact and Accountability (TFIA) to develop a 
range-of-practice study on how supervisors around the world define and evaluate the impact of their policies and 
actions, manage against that impact and then account for this impact to their external stakeholders. Moreover, in July 
2015, BCBS published a Report on the impact and accountability of banking supervision 
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d326.pdf), which compares the different accountability practices. 
11 R. IBRIDO, L’Unione bancaria europea. Profili costituzionali, Torino, Giappichelli, 2017, 232 ff. 
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291(2) TFEU.12 Secondly, the internal procedures and organization of the Council cannot be 
compared with the deliberative process of a Parliament. From this point of view, an eminent 
scholar pointed out that «the Council is still the most secretive legislature west of Beijing»13. On 
the contrary, per the general principles of Parliamentary Law, the publicity identifies an essential 
feature of the parliamentary institutions, defining the same identity of a Parliament. This 
notwithstanding, the Council was indeed recognized as one of the two pillars in charge of ensuring 
democratic legitimacy in the Lisbon Treaty (art. 10 TEU), though its members are to be 
themselves accountable to national parliaments or directly to the people which makes the 
accountability mechanisms vis-à-vis national parliaments contained in the SSM Regulation 
particularly worth analyzing. 
 
 
3.	 The	 interactions	 between	 the	 ECB	 and	 the	 European	
Parliament	within	the	Single	Supervisory	Mechanism	
 
 The European Parliament’s oversight powers within the Single Supervisory Mechanism are 
only partially defined by Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013. Indeed, Article 20(9) of the SSM 
Regulation refers to an Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the 
ECB for the concrete definition of the “practical modalities of the exercise of democratic 
accountability and scrutiny over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB by this 
Regulation.” The Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and ECB was 
published on 30 November 2013 in the Official Journal of the EU.14  
Moreover, in December 2013 the Council of the EU and the European Central bank signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on the cooperation related to the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism.15 The Memorandum implemented the accountability and reporting obligation of the 
ECB to the Council and the Euro Group under Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013. 
The Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and ECB can be divided into 
four parts.  
                                                
 
12 “Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts shall confer 
implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 
24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Council” (art. 291, par. 2 TFEU). 
13 S. HIX, What’s Wrong with the Europe Union and How to Fix It, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008. 
14 Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank on the practical 
modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the 
ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (2013/694/EU). 
15 Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of the European Union and the European Central Bank on 
the cooperation on procedures related to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).  
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Firstly, the Agreement defined some specific oversight procedures: a) the presentation of an 
Annual Report of the ECB at a public hearing of Parliament that concerns the execution of 
supervisory tasks within the SSM16; b) the power of the ECON Committee of the European 
Parliament to convene the Chair of the Supervisory Board for ordinary hearings, ad hoc exchanges 
of views and confidential meetings; c) the duty of the ECB to reply in writing to written questions 
put to it by the European Parliament as promptly as possible, and in any event within five weeks 
of their transmission to the ECB; and d) the possibility for the European Parliament to access 
some categories of information in possession of the ECB. 
Secondly, in the attempt to strengthen the standard of transparency in the selection process of the 
Chair and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, the Interinstitutional Agreement of 30 November 
2013 submitted their appointment to Parliament’s approval, which is held at a public hearing of 
the candidates proposed by the ECB. If the proposal for the Chair is not approved, the ECB may 
decide either to draw on the pool of candidates that originally applied for the position or to re-
initiate the selection process. From this point of view, these provisions present some analogies 
with the appointment procedure of the European Banking Authority Chairperson.17 
The European Parliament can use this sort of veto power also in relation to the ECB’s proposal to 
remove the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board from their office.  
Moreover, in the case that the European Parliament sets up a Committee of Inquiry, the ECB, in 
accordance with EU law, shall assist the Committee of Inquiry in carrying out its tasks in 
accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation. In exchange for this support, the European 
Parliament shall respect some confidentiality obligations. 
Finally, according to the Interinstitutional Agreement, the ECB shall pre-emptively inform the 
ECON Committee with regard to the main contents of some categories of acts that the ECB drafts 
to adopt within the SSM. This obligation is also established with reference to the Code of Conduct 
referred to in Article 19 of Regulation No. 1024/2013. 
In the course of 2015, the Chair of the Supervisory Board spoke before the EP ECON Committee 
for the presentation of the 2014 ECB Annual Report on supervisory activities. Moreover, he 
                                                
 
16 Article 13n of the ECB Rules of Procedure establishes that the Governing Council – upon a proposal from the 
Supervisory Board submitted by the Executive Board – adopts the Annual Report. However, the Chair of the 
Supervisory Board presents the Annual Report approved by the Governing Council to the European Parliament 
(Article 20 Reg. 1024/2013). According R. D’AMBROSIO (Il Meccanismo di Vigilanza Unico: profili di indipendenza 
e di Accountability, 2016, 89, at https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni-giuridici/2016-0081/QRG-
81.pdf), the Article 13n – in so far as it provides that the Annual Report of the SSM Regulation shall be adopted by 
the Governing Council – could potentially undermine the principle of independence of SSM as well as the principle of 
separation between monetary policy and supervision.  
17 Art. 48-2 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC 
and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC. 
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interacted within the EP ECON Committee within two ordinary public hearings, and two ad hoc 
exchanges of views. Eventually, the ECB published on its website 26 replies to questions from 
members of the European Parliament on supervisory matters and transmitted all the records of 
proceedings of its Supervisory Board meetings to the European Parliament. In 2016, the chair of 
the Supervisory Board also interacted in the occasion of two ordinary meetings with the EP ECON 
Committee as well as of three ad hoc exchanges of views.18 She was furthermore involved in the 
European Parliamentary Week 201619 and again presented the Annual report on supervisory 
activities to the EP ECON Committee, whereas Supervisory board vice-chair Sabine 
Lautenschläger additionally gave a speech at a parliamentary evening on 13 September 2016. The 
ECB published 34 replies to questions by MEPs on supervisory matters and again transmitted all 
the records of proceedings of its Supervisory Board meetings. Much to Parliament’s satisfaction, 
its information was improved this year as a result of the introduction of a new format to improve 
the records of proceedings. 
The European Parliament oversight powers defined by Regulation No. 806/2014 (SRM 
Regulation) mirror, in great part, the powers established by Regulation No. 1024/2013 and by the 
Interinstitutional agreement of November 2013. In particular, the Single Resolution Board attends 
regular hearing and exchanges of view in the European Parliament, which can address written 
questions and comments to the annual reports20. 
To a certain extent, the new powers of the European Parliament within the Banking Union seem to 
represent the partial reproduction and enhancement of the format already experimented with the 
Monetary Dialogue. Within this accountability dialogical procedure, the European Parliament 
oversees the ECB monetary policy through regular hearings and exchanges of views, written 
questions and the adoption of a recommendation in light of the ECB annual report.21 
As in the Monetary Dialogue, the new powers of the European Parliament within the Banking 
Union are rarely configured as definitive and fully binding. Nonetheless, the new ex post 
parliamentary oversight powers can potentially activate fruitful discourse dynamics with the 
purpose of making the Banking Union governance more transparent, more open and consequently, 
more legitimate. This dialogue does not exclude, but on the contrary, implies that the ECB 
maintains the “last word” with regard to competences that already before their transfer at EU 
                                                
 
18 ECB Annual report on supervisory authorities 2016, 2017, 51. 
19 https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2016/html/index.en.html  
20 Amplius, N. LUPO – R. IBRIDO, Which democratic oversight on the Banking Union? The role of the Euro-
national parliamentary system, in Law and Economics Yearly Review, 2, 2015, 289 ff. 
21 See F. AMTENBRINK – K. VAN DUIN, The European Central Bank before the European Parliament: theory and 
practice after 10 years of monetary dialogue, in European Law Review, 2009, 561 ff. 
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level, were in many Member States taken away from the entitlement of democratically elected 
bodies22. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to underestimate the potential democratic contribution of the new 
information rights conferred to the European Parliament. Indeed, the empowerment of this 
category of parliamentary powers could represent a first answer to the problem of the 
“informational asymmetry” between executive and legislative powers, that is one of the main 
factors at the bottom of the so called “Executive dominance issue”23. 
At the same time, the Banking Union experience offers a potential solution to enhance the quality 
of the parliamentary oversight over the ECB and in particular the democratic accountability within 
the Monetary Dialogue.  
Firstly, the involvement of the European Parliament within the appointment procedure of the 
Supervisory Board Chair could offer a model for a stronger parliamentarization of the Executive 
Board appointment procedure. 
Secondly, the Banking Dialogue could open new scenarios in the perspective of an involvement of 
the National Parliaments within the Monetary Dialogue. This point is analyzed in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
	
4.	National	parliaments’	relationship	with	the	ECB	in	the	
“Banking	Dialogues”24	
 
 Council Regulation 1024/2013 interestingly also foresees certain accountability 
mechanisms of the ECB vis-à-vis national parliaments as had been requested by national 
parliaments themselves.25 
The formalization of such type of relationships between both institutions is unique. This is 
because generally accountability is to be ensured at the same institutional level, i.e. EU institutions 
are to be accountable to other EU institutions whereas national institutions are in turn accountable 
                                                
 
22 See R. IBRIDO, L’Unione bancaria europea. Profili costituzionali, Torino, Giappichelli, 2017, 259 ff. 
23 See D. CURTIN, Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy, in The Modern Law Review, 1, 
2014, 1 ff. and notably 15. 
24 It is interesting to note that although one question on accountability within the SSM had been included in the 
2016 FIDE questionnaire on the Banking Union whose rapporteur was Takis Tridimas, only few of the national 
reports have included an answer to this question. FIDE, European Banking Union, Congress proceedings vol. 1, 
Wolters Kluwer, 2016.  
25 For a comparative perspective on the democratic accountability in the field of the banking supervision before the 
creation of the Banking Union, see R. IBRIDO, L’Unione bancaria europea. Profili costituzionali, Torino, 
Giappichelli, 2017, 262 ff. 
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to other national institutions.26 Recital 56 to the Regulation justifies this relationship with national 
parliaments as follows: “This role for national parliaments is appropriate given the potential 
impact that supervisory measures may have on public finances, credit institutions, their customers 
and employees, and the markets in the participating Member States”. One can however wonder if 
this impact is specific to the supervisory measures adopted in the framework of the SSM or if, on 
the contrary, the ECB’s actions are likely to produce effects important enough on Member States 
that they would justify closer relationships between the Central Bank and national parliaments in 
all its domains of activity.  
This assumption is confirmed by the organization of some informal dialogues between ECB and 
national parliaments which started to take place shortly before the SSM Regulation was adopted,27 
despite there not being any formal framework for the relationships between national parliaments 
and the ECB in its monetary policy.28 The relationships established by the SSM Regulation are 
therefore to be envisaged within the broader context of tighter relationships between the ECB and 
national parliaments. In that sense, Mario Draghi appears to have adopted a different approach 
from the one of his predecessor Jean-Claude Trichet as he is committed to increased 
transparency.29 For instance, after the ECB had announced its OMT programme in September 
2012, he accepted to appear before the German Bundestag. This visit was followed by another one 
to the Spanish Congress in February 2013 and yet another one to the French National assembly in 
June 2013. He also paid a visit to the Finnish parliament in November 2014 before he appeared 
before the Italian Chamber of deputies in March 2015. These meetings were organized in different 
settings in each of the parliaments: he appeared for instance before the Budget committee, the 
Finance Committee and the European Affairs Committee jointly in the Italian Chamber whereas in 
the French Assembly the session was hosted by the European Affairs Committee, the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the Finance Committee. Some of them were additionally held behind 
closed doors whereas others were broadcast and made available online. These practical 
                                                
 
26 On this point: : C. ZILIOLI, ‘The independence of the European Central Bank and its new banking supervisory 
competences’ in D. RITLENG (ed), Independence and legitimacy in the institutional system of the European Union, 
OUP, 2016, 176. Arguably, interparliamentary conferences have for instance indeed been said to contribute to holding 
Commission members to account but only indirectly since their main purpose is the exchange of information and best 
practices. Only the newly created Joint parliamentary group for the scrutiny of Europol has a clearer accountability 
function.  
27 On this evolution and the visits subsequently mentioned : D. JANCIC, ‘Accountability of the European Central 
Bank in a deepening economic Monetary Union’ in id. (ed), National parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the 
Euro crisis. Resilience or Resignation? OUP, 2017, 151f.  
28 M. BOVENS, D. CURTIN, ‘An unholy trinity of EU Presidents?: Political accountability of EU executive powers’ 
in D. CHALMERS, M. JACHTENFUCHS, C. JOERGES, The end of the Eurocrats’ dream. Adjusting to European diversity, 
CUP, 2016, 2010. 
29 FRAMKE A., KUEHNEN E., SUONINEN S., ‘Special report: How Mario Draghi is reshaping Europe’s central bank’, 
Reuters, 9.1.2013.  
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arrangements are far from being trivial as the events’ publicity and their potential to increase 
transparency will eventually depend on the chosen set up and as, most importantly, the level of 
expertise of the MPs debating with ECB representative will inevitably vary depending on which 
committee hosts the meeting. Of course in this matter regard must be had of the organization 
pattern in each national parliament since, for example, different rules apply in terms of the 
membership of their EU Affairs committee so that in some chambers the MPs belonging to that 
committee will necessarily have to belong to another sectoral committee at the same time whereas 
this will on the contrary not be allowed in other chambers.30  
These general remarks also bear some importance for the relationship to be developed between the 
ECB and national parliaments of the participating Member States in application of the SSM 
Regulation. It is first interesting to note before delving into the specific provisions on national 
parliaments that these are separated from the ones on ‘Accountability and reporting’ contained in 
article 20 as previously stated. Even though national parliaments are addressed under the same 
Chapter IV (Organizational principles), they are the subject of article 21 which is simply titled 
‘National parliaments’ without any further detail which is more in accordance with the principle 
according to which EU institutions are to be accountable to EU (and not national) institutions. 
Additionally, national parliaments’ involvement may actually endanger the Supervisory Board 
members’ capacity to respect their obligation to act in the interests of the Union as a whole as 
requested by article 26 of the SSM Regulation.31 Indeed, it is likely that the Board members will 
be called to their parliaments of nationality to avoid linguistic difficulties but it will be ‘difficult 
[…for said Board member] to bear in mind the obligation of the Supervisory Board to take 
account of the interests of the Union as a whole in its decisions if they clearly conflict with the 
national interest’.32 
In line with the direct information channel between EU institutions and national parliaments 
foreseen by article 12 TEU, article 21 establishes the direct transmission of the SSM annual report 
to national parliaments ‘simultaneously’ as it is forwarded to the European Parliament. In reaction 
to it, ‘[n]ational parliaments may address their reasoned observations to that report’. Additionally, 
‘[n]ational parliaments of the participating Member States, through their own procedures, may 
request the ECB to reply in writing to any observations or questions submitted by them to the 
                                                
 
30 On the composition of the EU Affairs committees see: T. FREIXES et al, Constitucionalismo multinivel y 
relaciones entre Parlamentos: Parlamento europeo, Parlamentos nacionales y Parlamentos regionales con 
competencias legislativa, CEPC, 2013.  
31 C. ZILIOLI, ‘The independence of the European Central Bank and its new banking supervisory competences’ in 
D. RITLENG (ed), Independence and legitimacy in the institutional system of the European Union, OUP, 2016, 176-
177. 
32 Ibid.  
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ECB in respect of the tasks of the ECB under this Regulation’ (art. 21-2). A certain unclarity 
concerning this procedure however exists: whereas article 21-2 unambiguously provides for the 
possibility that national parliaments request from the ECB that it replies to any observation or 
question – albeit in writing only –, recital 56 less clearly states that the ECB may reply to them, 
thus implying that such an answer is at the ECB’s discretion. Recitals are not legally binding as 
they are merely included to shed light on the norm which they precede; hence the ECB is under 
the obligation to answer to national parliaments’ questions and observations. Yet, this apparent 
contradiction is somewhat puzzling. 
In addition to this written procedure, face-to-face exchanges of view may be organized with the 
Chair or a member of the Supervisory Board ‘in relation to the supervision of credit institutions in 
that Member State’ (art. 21-3).  
Before proceeding with this analysis, it should be noted that these rights were solely attributed to 
the national parliaments of the participating Member States. While this makes sense in the light of 
the rationale for the introduction of these prerogatives recalled above, it also formalizes the 
asymmetry among Member States that exists in this field whereas it confirms the European 
Parliament in its quality as the legislature for the Union as a whole.33  
These provisions concerning national parliaments – which indeed are much less protective than 
those concerning the European Parliament – did not fully satisfy them. The French National 
Assembly underlined for instance that national parliaments’ prerogatives appear to be limited 
especially if one bears in mind the control powers they had at the time of their introduction over 
national supervisory authorities and in the light of the consequences surveillance measures can 
have on public finances and credit institutions among others.34 The rapporteurs in charge of the 
report on the progress of the Banking Union and the economic integration in the framework of the 
Economic and monetary Union indicated also that they did not receive any response from the ECB 
to the queries they had addressed in the framework of their preparation and that they considered 
necessary for national parliaments to receive the reports of the surveillance board meetings just 
like the European Parliament does. The UK House of Lords similarly concluded that ‘an effective, 
calibrated and streamlined mechanism of accountability to national parliaments should be 
established, in particular in relation to individual supervision decisions that have a significant 
impact on an individual Member State’s banking sector. It must be for national Parliaments to set 
                                                
 
33 Further on this: R. IBRIDO, N. LUPO, ‘Which democratic oversight on the Banking Union? The role of the euro-
national parliamentary system’, Law and Economics Yearly Review, 2015, 289-322, 312-313.  
34 Assemblée nationale, Rapport d’information nº 1665 déposé par la Commission des Affaires européennes sur les 
progrès de l’union bancaire et de l’intégration économique au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire (C. 
CARESCHE, M. HERBILLON, D. QUENTIN), 18.12.2013, 17. 
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out how any new accountability structures and frameworks should operate in practice’.35 In this 
context, it is also important to bear in mind that (some) national parliaments have kept some 
investigative powers over their national competent authorities. This could interfere with the 
independence of the SSM decision-making process, which in turn would affect the ECB’s 
responsibility in the SSM and its need to be held accountable. 
As concerns the practice of these instruments, it should be noted that the information available in 
the ECB’s annual reports as well as on its website are rather scarce. The Annual report for 2016 
for instance simply states that ‘As part of the reporting requirements under the SSM Regulation, 
representatives of the ECB involved in banking supervision took part in exchanges of views with 
national parliaments’; nothing further is stated on these exchanges of views. A similar statement 
had additionally already been enclosed in the 2015 report. Only in reference to 2014 had the 
Annual report contained some additional information as it specifically referred to two exchanges 
with the German Bundestag and the French National Assembly. The news section commonly 
entails some information on these exchanges of views as they are taking place but this information 
is not available in any dedicated section. Although the problem highlighted here is more one of 
transparency than of impediment to access ECB documents, such scarce information could be seen 
as being somewhat at odds with the content of recitals 69 of the SSM Regulation which states that 
‘The regulation referred to in Article 15(3) TFEU should determine detailed rules enabling access 
to documents held by the ECB resulting from the carrying out of supervisory tasks, in accordance 
with the TFEU’, whereby article 15-3 TFEU defines principles of transparency and document 
access to all EU citizens.  
Data obtained from the ECB directly shows that two of such exchanges of views took place every 
year in 2014, 2015 and 2016 and involved the German Bundestag (Finance Committee), the 
French National Assembly (European Affairs Committee), the Dutch House of Representatives 
(Finance Committee), the Italian Senate (twice) (Treasury and Finance Committee) and the 
Slovenian National Assembly. It is interesting to note that whereas the exchange of views 
organized by the French Assembly mentioned previously had brought together several committees 
among which the specialized Finance committee, in this occasion only the members of the 
European Affairs Committee were involved.36 By contrast, in the German Bundestag, in the Dutch 
House of representatives, in the Italian Senate the exchanges of views took place before sectoral 
specialized committees, i.e. the Finance Committee and the Treasury and Finance Committee. 
                                                
 
35 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 7th report of session 2012-13, European Banking Union: key 
issues and challenges, 2012, 46. 
36 Assemblée nationale, Commission des Affaires européennes, Compte-rendu nº177 du 16 décembre 2014 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/europe/c-rendus/c0177.asp.  
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Even if of course some members of the finance committee may be also members of the European 
Affairs Committee – in France, dual membership is mandatory –, it can be reasonably expected 
that these members are, in general, less capable of holding the ECB to account for its actions than 
the members of the other parliaments’ sectoral committees were. Hence, it is necessary to monitor 
the identity of the MPs who are to check on the ECB’s actions to establish whether the 
accountability mechanisms are likely to be efficient or not. 
 It is regrettable that the information regarding these exchanges of views are not more easily 
accessible in a common place of the ECB’s website (and are not more detailed in the Annual 
reports) especially seeing as, as illustrated previously, the instruments national parliaments have 
are already of a soft nature despite the impact of the ECB’s decisions on their Member States; it is 
true though that banking supervision is a particularly delicate matter in which too much publicity 
may influence the markets and hence have a global impact and that therefore national parliaments’ 
powers could have hardly been stronger. Furthermore, such opacity contrasts with Mario Draghi’s 
original commitment to more transparency. It would however not be difficult for the ECB to 
simply list the exchanges of views in which it participated in a given year together with any 
observation or question it received from national parliaments, although national parliaments 
themselves should arguably take the initiative in this regard. They could, for instance, invite the 
ECB to reorganize the information and make it more easily accessible by using the possibility 
offered to them to comment on the Annual reports.  
A recent example of a difficult relationship between the ECB and the Portuguese parliament 
actually indicates that the ECB is not fully as open to exchanges with national parliaments as it 
claims.37 In Spring 2016, the Portuguese parliament invited ECB vice-president Vítor Constâncio 
to attend the meeting of an enquiry committee on a Portuguese banking institution that went 
bankrupt in 2015, Banif. The vice-president declined the invitation alleging that the ECB only 
answers to the European Parliament. Therefore he could not take part in the meeting. Interestingly, 
a similar argument had already been used by Mario Draghi when he was requested to participate 
in an enquiry by the Irish parliament after the banking crisis in 2014 and 2015.38 However, 
whereas the Irish request did not fall under the SSM Regulation, the Portuguese one did, hence the 
Portuguese parliament should have at least received an answer in writing. The Portuguese 
parliament was however not fully playing by the book either: it was claiming the existence of an 
                                                
 
37 More detailed on this episode: N. COELHO and D. FROMAGE, The ECB in check: a case from Portugal on the 
new Single Supervisor Mechanism, Blog droit européen, 9.6.2016 available at: 
https://blogdroiteuropeen.com/2016/06/09/the-ecb-in-check-a-case-from-portugal-on-the-new-single-supervisory-
mechanism-by-nelson-coelho-et-diane-fromage/ [26.3.2017].  
38 D. GRIFFIN, ‘Inquiry strongly criticises ECB over refusal to attend hearings’, The Irish Times, 27.1.2016.  
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obligation on the ECB to attend the meeting of the enquiry committee whereas no such obligation 
exists. Besides, its invitation was not addressed to the right person since it chose to invite ECB 
vice president Vítor Constâncio who ‘randomly’ happened to be a Portuguese national and had 
already been heard in a parliamentary enquiry as former governor of the Portuguese Central Bank. 
Instead, it should have invited the Chair of the Supervisory Board Eventually the Portuguese 
parliament did after all receive said answer but this procedure has proven anything but easy.  
Bearing this example in mind as well as the ECB’s limited transparency and the few exchanges of 
views organized so far (six in total), it can be regretted that little efforts are being made to make 
the most of this innovative and promising additional channel of accountability.  
 
5.	Conclusion	
 
 As illustrated above, the SSM Regulation has established an innovative and unique 
framework for the accountability of the ECB in its quality as supervisory authority in the Banking 
Union. So far, national parliaments had not been included; only the European Parliament had. 
However, national parliaments and the European Parliament were not placed on an equal footing 
so that the European Parliament alone, together with the Council, shall ensure accountability 
whereas national parliaments are to be informed and be able to submit observations and questions 
as well as organize hearings. After the difficulties faced by the Portuguese parliament in 2016, it 
will be necessary to observe how these soft prerogatives are unfolded in practice to determine 
whether they are of any added value to national parliaments or not.  
A possibility to enhance the role of national parliaments and the European Parliament together 
could be for them to enhance their cooperation. In this way, they could exchange useful 
information and best practices and hence be better able to remedy to the often existing lack of 
information or informational asymmetry among them with some being better informed than 
others. Should some national parliaments manage to establish closer relationships to the ECB than 
others as might be anticipated of the parliaments of the largest Eurozone Member States, enhanced 
interparliamentary cooperation could help those who are less fortunate in the scrutiny exercise of 
their own national government. As recalled above, the SSM Regulation indeed clearly established 
both the European Parliament and the Council and the institutions ensuring the ECB’s 
accountability so that national parliaments should use this indirect channel too. The next question 
is of course how such closer interparliamentary cooperation should in practice take place. In the 
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light of the almost uncontrolled blossoming of initiatives for interparliamentary cooperation,39 it 
appears rather undesirable to create yet again a new interparliamentary conference. Similarly, the 
Conference on Stability, Coordination and Governance is probably not the best setting for 
effective scrutiny mechanisms – even if matters related to the Banking Union were addressed in its 
framework in the past – since four years after its creation it is doubtful whether it will ever be truly 
effective. Questions such as the lack of any rule concerning the composition of each national 
delegation or fluctuating attendance – of officials alone in certain cases – imply that it is deemed 
to remain solely a forum for the exchange of information and best practices in the near future. For 
now, one could therefore envisage increased informal interparliamentary cooperation and the use 
of COSAC as a platform: it could already prove useful for instance for parliaments’ scrutiny for 
the SSM to be the object of one section of an upcoming COSAC bi-annual report so that 
parliaments at least know what their counterparts are doing in this domain.  
Be this at it may, it remains that it might prove difficult to clearly separate the different functions 
of the ECB for them to be addressed in the appropriate and specific “dialogical” procedure, 
especially as the activities it pursues as banking supervisor may have implications for its activities 
in the monetary field.40 This is also particularly important to avoid fragmentation41 but also to 
make an optimal use of the available resources. Indeed, the question of fragmentation is a crucial 
one since it makes external control more difficult. In an already particularly complex and technical 
policy area as is the oversight over the ECB with its three main components – monetary policy, 
Banking Union and the European Systemic Risk Board (body chaired by the ECB President42) – it 
                                                
 
39 Formal and informal initiatives for interparliamentary cooperation among national and European parliaments are 
indeed always more numerous and more difficult to follow for citizens which arguably mitigates their potential as 
factors of ‘democratic boost’ within the EU. See on this phenomenon: D. FROMAGE, Increasing interparliamentary 
cooperation: Current trend and challenges, European Public Law, 2016.  
40 See on these potential overlaps: G. CLAEYS, M. HALLBERG, O. TSCHEKASSIN, ‘European Central Bank 
accountability: How the monetary dialogue could evolve’, Bruegel policy contribution 2014/04, 2014, 10-11. 
41 See on the issue of fragmentation: R. IBRIDO, Il controllo democratico della politica monetaria: equilibri 
costituzionali e integrazione europea dopo le sentenze OMT, in Federalismi, 5, 2017, notably 22. 
42 According to the art. 19 Reg. 1092/2010 “At least annually and more frequently in the event of widespread 
financial distress, the Chair of the ESRB shall be invited to an annual hearing in the European Parliament, marking the 
publication of the ESRB’s annual report to the European Parliament and the Council. That hearing shall be conducted 
separately from the monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and the President of the ECB. 
2. The annual report referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain the information that the General Board decides to 
make public in accordance with Article 18. The annual report shall be made available to the public. 
3. The ESRB shall also examine specific issues at the invitation of the European Parliament, the Council or the 
Commission. 
4. The European Parliament may request the Chair of the ESRB to attend a hearing of the competent Committees 
of the European Parliament. 
5. The Chair of the ESRB shall hold confidential oral discussions at least twice a year and more often if deemed 
appropriate, behind closed doors with the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of 
the European Parliament on the ongoing activity of the ESRB. An agreement shall be concluded between the 
European Parliament and the ESRB on the detailed modalities of organising those meetings, with a view to ensuring 
full confidentiality in accordance with Article 8. The ESRB shall provide a copy of that agreement to the Council.” 
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may prove difficult for MPs and MEPs to always know in which forum and in what way they can 
address which ECB representative on a specific issue. 
 Eventually the ECB is in a stronger and better position to use this fragmentation to escape 
adequate parliamentary accountability since it has the overview and the required specialized 
knowledge. 
Beyond all this, one can wonder whether the new “Banking dialogue” of second generation can 
perhaps represent a model for the older Monetary dialogue and in particular whether it could be 
justified to involve national parliaments in the Monetary dialogue too. The same soft powers 
national parliaments have been given in the Banking dialogue could be attributed to them in the 
monetary field too, i.e. they could have to possibility to receive the Annual report from the ECB 
directly, to issue comments or questions and to invited ECB representative for exchanges of 
views. In this way, the informational asymmetry sometimes observable between parliaments and 
governments and among parliaments themselves would be avoided and the only obstacle to further 
parliamentary scrutiny would be parliaments’ own lack of mobilization. At a time when the ECB’s 
policy in this framework are sometimes doubted which hence gives rise to increased problems of 
democratic legitimacy, perhaps one way to remedy to these issues would indeed be to 
systematically involve national parliaments too. As recalled above, some informal initiatives have 
indeed existed in the past but with the important risk that in the absence of any formal obligation, 
the ECB remains free to choose which parliaments it decides to visit and which not – just like the 
European Commission is free in her choice to visit one parliamentary chamber or another in the 
framework of its informal Political Dialogue with national parliaments. While a certain degree of 
formalization appears desirable, a new institutional design which would prevent the ECB from 
having to travel to each and every single parliamentary chamber should nevertheless be elaborated 
since otherwise the Central Bank would in any case most probably not be able to abound to all 
requests simply for practical reasons.  
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